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11 Introduction
Every year governments and private sector ﬁrms place numerous orders by running pro-
curement auctions. For instance, governments of Western nations procure about 10 % of
national product annually.1 For the private sector, Burt, Norquist, and Anklesaria (1990)
report that in the United States the fraction of purchased inputs increased from 20 % to
56 % of the selling price of ﬁnished goods during the last 50 years. A substantial fraction
of this procurement takes place by competitive bidding.
Usually, over time ﬁrms participate in more than one procurement auction. In this
case, a ﬁrm’s cost of providing one object is quite likely not independent of the allocation
of other production rights. Rather, one often observes that the production right for one
object guarantees the ﬁrm a comparative cost advantage in a follow–up procurement sit-
uation. This may be due to scale eﬀects or due to technology improvements from earlier
production processes. There may also be situations where current success decreases future
opportunities, for example if a ﬁrm already produces close to its capacity bound. Rational
ﬁrms will account for the expected comparative cost (dis)advantage in future auctions in
their price oﬀers today.
In particular if several consecutive projects are complementary (as for example, building
a facility and the service contract for this facility), a government may consider to procure
the contracts as a bundle instead of running a sequence of separate auctions. The reason
is that if the contracts are complements bids are presumably more aggressive since ﬁrms
bidding for the bundle base their oﬀers on much lower expected total production cost.2
Note, however, that procurement of the bundle has to take place before production of
the ﬁrst object is due. Thus, after the bundle auction ﬁrms may observe additional cost
relevant information for parts of the contracted issues. Moreover, small ﬁrms (that are
typically excluded in the bundle auction3) may still be in the position to compete for parts
of the bundle. All this suggests that aftermarket trade should play an important role after
a bundle auction. As a matter of fact, subcontracting is a common phenomenon in many
procurement situations where contracts oblige the successful ﬁrm to provide a variety of
1Cf. McAfee and McMillan (1987).
2Also, the literature on optimal auctions suggests that bundling may increase the auctioneer’s revenue,
even in absence of synergies. Cf. Palfrey (1983), Armstrong (2000), and Avery and Hendershott (2000).
3Usually ﬁrms have to prove their ability to carry out the project in advance and are only eligible to
bid in an auction for a contract if they qualiﬁed.
2goods and services.4 In contrast, in separate auctions each object can be procured relatively
close to its actual delivery date, when the details of the corresponding contract can be well
deﬁned. Moreover, all ﬁrms that are qualiﬁed to deliver a single object can participate in
the respective auction.
The model analyzed in this paper is a stylized version of the procurement setting de-
scribed above. We have two objects that may be complements or substitutes.5 Costs for
the ﬁrst object are observed at an earlier point in time (at stage one) than costs for the
second object (at stage two). Several multiproduct ﬁrms are eligible to bid for both objects,
while additional singleproduct ﬁrms can only compete for the second one. Delivery of the
ﬁrst (second) object is due at the end of period one (two). Prior to production, each object
can be reallocated among the ﬁrms (this implies that the allocation of the ﬁrst object is
irreversible at stage two).
In this framework we compare a sequential and a bundle auction. We ﬁnd that the
sequential auction allocates eﬃciently6, whereas the bundle auction achieves lower procure-
ment cost. The reason is that the winner of the bundle auction anticipates relatively high
proﬁts from subcontracting at stage two which are competed away in the auction at stage
one. A comparison with the optimal sequential auction reveals that the bundle auction ac-
tually implements almost the optimal allocation rule (that minimizes overall procurement
cost). In both mechanisms the stage two–allocation rule favors the stage one–winner and
discriminates against the losers in order to increase competition at stage one. Moreover we
show that the price is less risky in the bundle auction, since here the seller passes the price
risk associated with the ﬁnal allocation of the second object to the bidders. For complemen-
tary goods (where bundle auctions are a much more natural choice than for substitutes),
our results apply to both, ﬁrst and second price auctions.
Let us ﬁnally discuss the literature related to the topics we analyze. Von der Fehr and
Riis (1998), Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002), and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2005) ana-
lyze sequential auctions with the same timing of information revelation. Von der Fehr and
Riis study how future market opportunities aﬀect the bidding behavior (and thereby the
equilibrium price sequence) in sequential second–price auctions auctions, while Jeitschko
4Kamien (1989), as well as Gale, Hausch, and Stegeman (2000) give a variety of examples for horizontal
subcontracting.
5Although most of our results apply also to substitutes, complementary goods are the more natural
scenario to consider bundle auctions.
6The eﬃciency result holds only if the sequential auction is second price.
3and Wolfstetter, as well as Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer compare sequential ﬁrst– and
second–price auctions in the presence of stochastic economies or diseconomies of scale.
They ﬁnd that second price auctions yield lower (higher) procurement cost if the objects
are complements (substitutes). Their results imply that the revenue ranking between bun-
dle and sequential auctions extends to ﬁrst price auctions in case of complementary goods,
but not necessarily if goods are substitutes.
A seminal contribution to the question of bundling versus separate sales is Palfrey
(1983). He ﬁnds that, even without synergies, a monopolist often prefers bundling as
compared to selling the objects in independent auctions. There are also a number of recent
theoretical analyses of multi unit auctions. Armstrong (2000) and Avery and Hendershott
(2000) derive properties of the optimal multi unit auction when types are multidimensional.7
Both ﬁnd that the optimal auction favors bundling in a probabilistic sense: a high bid on
one product increases the probability of winning another product. However, additional
competition for a product reduces the proﬁtability of all bundles including this product
for the auctioneer. Levin (1997) and Branco (1997) characterize the optimal multi unit
auction in case of synergies. Both authors make the problem tractable by reducing it to a
onedimensional mechanism design problem (i. e. each bidder observes only one private signal
that determines his valuation for each single object, and for the bundle). Levin considers a
model with only multiproduct bidders who may also submit bids on single objects, whereas
Branco also considers singleproduct bidders, however, multiproduct bidders are not allowed
to bid for single units.
Frequently used auction rules are analyzed and compared by a variety of papers. Mostly
they assume one–dimensional types and model synergies by addition of a positive constant.8
Menezes and Monteiro (2003) ﬁnd that in a model with only multiproduct bidders with
superadditive valuations a sequential auction and a bundle auction are revenue equivalent.
Only few papers consider the possibility of trade after the auction. Gale, Hausch, and
Stegeman (2000) analyze sequential procurement auctions where resale is proﬁtable due to
convex cost.9 Haile (1999) and Gupta and Lebrun (1998) analyze resale which is due to
7Armstrong has only multiproduct bidders, whereas Avery and Hendershott consider one multiproduct
bidder competing with several singleproduct bidders. Unlike in our model, the authors assume that all
valuations are drawn at the same time.
8This model goes back to Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and was employed, e. g. by Branco (1997a) and
Albano, Germano, and Lovo (1999).
9This is also the reason for subcontracting in Kamien, Li, and Samet (1989).
4an ineﬃcient outcome of the initial auction. In Haile this results from noisy signals at the
time of the initial auction, in Gupta and Lebrun the initially ineﬃcient allocation is due to
asymmetries between bidders.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the model. In section 3 we
give a description of the bundle and the sequential auction and derive equilibrium bidding
strategies and prices. In section 4 we characterize the optimal sequential auction. A
comparison of all three mechanisms is given in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider procurement of two contracts that need to be acquired in two successive peri-
ods. Bidders privately observe their cost at the beginning of each period, i. e. the second
period’s draw is not yet known in the ﬁrst period.10 The market for the second item may
be more competitive. In particular, m multiproduct ﬁrms are eligible to acquire both con-
tracts, while n − m additional singleproduct ﬁrms are only eligible to bid for the second
one (n ≥ m).
We denote by Q = (Q1,...,Qm) the multiproduct ﬁrms’ costs for the ﬁrst contract.
Cost Qi, i = 1,...,m, is distributed on the interval [Q,Q] with c.d.f. Gi and density gi.
The winner of the ﬁrst contract is assumed to have a stochastic comparative cost advantage
or disadvantage for the second contract. We shall call this ﬁrm ”incumbent” (I), while the
multiproduct ﬁrms that do not provide the ﬁrst contract are called ”contestants” (C).
The random vector X = (X1,X2,...,Xm,...,Xn) ∈ [0,1]n denotes production costs for
the second contract. We order the components of X such that X1 denotes the incumbent’s,
X2,...,Xm the contestants’, and Xm+1,...,Xn the singleproduct bidders’ cost for the
second contract. Cost Xi, i = 1,...,n, is distributed according to c.d.f. Fi with density
fi. Contestants are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their cost for the second
item, i. e. the random variables X2,...,Xm follow the same distribution as a reference
variable XC that is distributed according to c.d.f. FC with density fC. We assume that X1
and XC can be ranked by ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. We say that the contracts are
complements (substitutes) if X1 ≤FSD XC (X1 ≥FSD XC).
Finally, we assume that the components of (Q,X) are independent. We denote by
10This kind of assumption is suitable if there is a considerable lapse of time between the two periods, or
when the exact speciﬁcation of the contract is not yet communicated by the procurement agency.
5Q(j) and X(j) the jth order statistic of the random variables in Q and X, respectively,




(j) denote the jth
order statistic of all random variables in X except for X1 (the incumbent’s cost) and one
representative contestant’s cost, respectively.
In the following, we focus on two diﬀerent mechanisms: (a) a bundle auction of both
contracts in period one, or (b) sequential procurement of one contract each period. We
assume that every single transaction is made by a second–price auction where the lowest
bidder wins and is paid the second lowest bid.
3 Equilibria
3.1 The Sequential Auction
In a sequential auction every bidder who is eligible to provide a single object can participate
in the respective competition. The auction of the ﬁrst (second) contract takes place in
period one (two), after the ﬁrms have observed their private cost of providing the contract
that is auctioned oﬀ.
We analyze the game by backward induction. In the second auction, bidding the true
cost of the second contract is a (weakly) dominant strategy for every bidder. Therefore, the
expected price in the second auction is equal to the expected value of the second highest
cost, that is
E[P2] =E[X(2)]. (1)
Now consider the ﬁrst auction. A multiproduct bidder who wins the ﬁrst auction has
an additional proﬁt, ΠI
2, from the second auction, whenever his cost for the second item is






(1) − X1;X1 ≤ X
{−1}
(1) ]. (2)
However, a multiproduct bidder who did not win the ﬁrst auction (a contestant) also faces a
positive proﬁt from the second auction, ΠC
2 . A contestant’s expected proﬁt from the second
auction is given by
E[Π
C
2 ] = E[X
{−C}
(1) − XC;XC ≤ X
{−C}
(1) ]. (3)
11In order to simplify notation we deﬁne E[V ;A] = E[V |A]Prob[A].
6In appendix A we show that the value of incumbency, E[ΠI
2] − E[ΠC
2 ], is positive (neg-
ative) if the contracts are complements (substitutes). That is, a bidder i who wins the
ﬁrst auction incurs cost qi but also ”wins” an additional expected proﬁt from the second
auction, E[ΠI
2] − E[ΠC
2 ], which is negative in case of substitutes. Therefore, perceived cost
of winning the ﬁrst contract, qi − (E[ΠI
2] − E[ΠC
2 ]), diﬀers from the real cost of provid-
ing the ﬁrst contract, qi. Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies yields that
bidders in the ﬁrst auction bid their perceived cost of winning the ﬁrst contract, that is
bi = qi−(E[ΠI
2]−E[ΠC
2 ]).12 Therefore, the expected price in the sequential auction is given
by










































We can rearrange the expression to get
Proposition 1 Expected procurement cost in the sequential auction is






















3.2 The Bundle Auction
A bundle auction necessarily takes place in period one, before the ﬁrst contract has to be
allocated. At that time bidders have observed their individual cost for the ﬁrst, but not
for the second item. Only ﬁrms that are eligible to compete for both contracts can bid in
a bundle auction.13
The fact that bidders observe their cost for the second contract after the bundle auction
has taken place implies potentially positive gains from trade of the second contract at stage
12Obviously, the ﬁrst auction bid falls short of the cost of providing the ﬁrst item if the value of incum-
bency, E[ΠI
2] − E[ΠC
2 ], is positive, which is true in the case of stochastic scale eﬀects. From appendix A
it follows immediately that the reverse is true if X1 ≥FSD XC (stochastic diseconomies). These ﬁndings
mirror the ﬁndings of von der Fehr and Riis (1998).
13This is only relevant if there is a positive number of single unit bidders, i. e. n > m. Otherwise, all
bidders can participate.
7two (if the incumbent’s production cost for the second contract turns out to be higher than
the cost observed by one or more competitors). We allow for resale and assume that the
winner of the bundle auction chooses the resale mechanism. The characterization of the
optimal auction rules in this context goes back to Myerson (1981):
Lemma 1 (Optimal Subcontracting Mechanism Γ∗) Deﬁne virtual cost of bidder i
by
γi(xi) = xi +
Fi(xi)
fi(xi)
, i = 2,...,n, (6)
and assume that virtual cost γi(xi) is strict monotone increasing.14 The incumbent’s ex-
pected cost of providing the second contract is minimized if he awards the subcontract to the
ﬁrm with the lowest virtual cost γi(xi), provided it is lower than its own cost, x1.
The ﬁrm that is awarded the contract is paid the highest cost it could have had such
that its virtual cost were still lower than the minimum of the lowest virtual cost among its
competitors and the incumbent’s cost, x1.
Obviously, any bidder expects the same additional proﬁts from the subcontracting stage as




The expected proﬁt at stage two aﬀects a bidder’s perceived cost of providing the bundle
of contracts: Bidder i’s expected cost of providing both contracts himself is qi+E[X1]. The
expected proﬁt from the subcontracting stage as incumbent, E[ΠI
S(Γ∗)], lowers the expected
perceived cost of bidder i (i. e. makes winning the bundle auction more valuable). However,
also the outside option is positive, since in case of loosing the auction a multiproduct bidder
still faces positive expected proﬁts E[ΠC
S(Γ∗)] from the subcontracting stage. This makes
him less eager to win the bundle auction. Summing up, perceived cost of providing both
items is qi+E[X1]−E[ΠI
S(Γ∗)]+E[ΠC
S(Γ∗)].15 At a bid equal to his perceived cost bidder i
is just indiﬀerent between winning or loosing the bundle auction. This yields the following
Proposition 2 Expected procurement cost in the bundle auction is







14A suﬃcient condition is that reverse hazard rates fi(xi)/Fi(xi) are strict monotone decreasing.
15Note that without a subcontracting stage it holds that E[ΠI
S(Γ)] = E[ΠC
S(Γ)] = 0.
84 The Optimal Sequential Auction
In order to assess the relative performance of the bundle and the sequential auction, in
the following we derive expected total procurement cost depending on the stage one and
stage two allocation rules denoted φ1(q) and φ2(x).16 We assume that the auctioneer has
to commit to a set of rules prior to period one and cannot modify those rules after the ﬁrst
period.17 Denote by π
j
i(y,z) bidder i’s expected payoﬀ in period j if he observed cost y but
reported cost z. We get
Lemma 2 Any incentive compatible procurement mechanism where bidders participate vol-










































































Proof See appendix B. ￿
From the above expression, we can easily deduce the optimal sequential auction that
minimizes expected procurement cost. The ﬁrst line implies that the ﬁrst auction is an
ordinary ﬁrst or second price auction. The second line becomes zero since a ﬁrm that
observes the highest possible cost for the ﬁrst object is just left with a contestant’s expected
proﬁt as an outside option. The integral in line three to four is minimized pointwisely by
allocation to the bidder with the lowest virtual cost as deﬁned in the following
16A standard result of mechanism design theory is that expected payoﬀs are fully determined by the
allocation rule up to a constant.
17See also Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2005) who use the optimal sequential auction rule in the case
of only two multiproduct bidders to provide intuition for the comparison between ﬁrst and second price
sequential auctions.
9Proposition 3 (Optimal Sequential Auction) Deﬁne virtual costs ψi(xi) of the
three types of bidders in the second auction as follows:
ψ1(x1) = x1 for the incumbent,




fC(xC) for a contestant,





fS(xS) for a singleproduct bidder.
(9)
Procurement cost is minimized by conducting a regular ﬁrst or second price auction in
period one and awarding the second contract to the bidder with the lowest virtual cost for
that contract, as deﬁned by (9). This bidder is paid the highest cost he could have had such
that his virtual cost were still lowest. The other bidders pay or receive nothing at stage two.
Note that the stage two allocation rule of the optimal sequential auction diﬀers sub-
stantially from the the allocation rule the auctioneer would like to implement after period
one.18 Independently of the relative strengths of the diﬀerent bidders (i. e. independently of
whether the goods are complements or substitutes), the optimal sequential auction always
favors the incumbent at the second stage. The reason is that by favoring the incumbent
and discriminating against the contestants and the singleproduct bidders at stage two, the
auctioneer makes winning the ﬁrst auction more valuable. In particular, the incumbent’s
expected stage two proﬁt is relatively high, while a contestant’s expected proﬁt (the ”loser’s
option value”) is rather low. Note moreover that the participation constraint at stage one
requires that discrimination against the contestants and the singleproduct bidders is such
that any multiproduct bidder is just indiﬀerent between being treated as singleproduct bid-
der and contestant at stage two, which reﬂects in the corresponding virtual costs. We can
summarize that in the optimal sequential auction the stage two allocation rule is designed
to extract as much of the expected future proﬁts as possible already at stage one.
5 Bundling versus Sequential Procurement
Now we are in the position to compare sequential and bundle sales and relate the two
auctions to the optimal sequential auction.
Note that from propositions 1 to 3 it follows that in all three mechanisms the allocation
of the ﬁrst contract is eﬃcient. That is, the mechanisms diﬀer only with respect to the
18In a nutshell, the optimal auction at stage two (in ignorance of the ﬁrst stage) would discriminate against
the strong bidders, that is, against the incumbent in case of complements and against the contestants in
case of substitutes.
10stage two–allocation rule: While in the sequential second price auction also the allocation
of the second contract is eﬃcient, in the bundle auction and the optimal sequential auction
this is not the case. In both auctions distortion is based on two kinds of information about
the bidders: (a) their distributions and (b) whether they have won at the ﬁrst stage or
not. Note that both, the bundle and the optimal auction favor the incumbent at stage two
independently of his distribution, however, to a diﬀerent extent. We can prove the following
Theorem 1 (Bundle versus Sequential Auctions) Suppose all bidders bidding for
the subcontract are symmetric.19 The following claims hold true:
(i) In the bundle auction expected procurement cost is lower than in the sequential auction
but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction, i. e. E[P OSA] < E[P BA] <
E[P SEQ].
(ii) The sequential auction is eﬃcient, whereas the bundle auction is ineﬃcient.
(iii) The price in the bundle auction second order stochastically dominates the overall price
in the sequential auction.
Proof (i) Note that expected procurement cost as given by (8) is minimized by always
awarding the second contract to the bidder with the lowest virtual cost as deﬁned by (9).

















. Since in those cases the
allocation rule of the bundle auction deviates from the allocation rule that pointwisely
minimizes (8), expected procurement cost must be higher in the bundle auction than in the
optimal auction.
In order to see why procurement cost in the sequential second price auction is higher











. Obviously, the sequential
second price auction ”misallocates” whenever the bundle auction does, but the reverse is
not true. Thus, from (8) it immediately follows that procurement cost must be lower in
the bundle auction than in the sequential second price auction.
(ii) Is obvious given the allocation rules.
19Theorem 1 can be extended to situations, where the random variables XC,Xm+1,...Xn do not follow
the same distribution. In a previous version of this paper (Grimm, 2004) we show that only if the contestants
are ”weak” compared to the singleproduct bidders we need a very mild condition to establish the result.
11(iii) Suppose the stage two–allocation rule after the bundle auction was also eﬃcient (i. e. the
incumbent subcontracts by a second price auction with a reserve price equal to his own
observed cost xi). Then, due to the revenue equivalence theorem it must hold that E[P BA] =





S(Γe)]. Then, we have












2 ] + E[P2] − ∆
∗,




2 ] + P2 (11)
= PBS + ∆
∗ + [P2 − E[P2]].
Note that Q(2) and P2 are independent random variables. Therefore, PSEQ is a mean
preserving spread of PBS+∆∗, which implies that PBS second order stochastically dominates
PSEQ,21 which completes the proof. ￿
It turns out that from a revenue point of view the government beneﬁts from delegating
the allocation of the second contract to the incumbent by running a bundle auction. The
reason is that compared to the eﬃcient allocation rule the incumbent expects a higher and a
contestant a lower proﬁt from allocation of the second contract. This makes stage one bids
more competitive in the bundle auction. Note that the result is independent of whether
the goods are complements or substitutes.
We have also shown that, although to a lesser extent, the bundle auction exhibits the
same features as the optimal sequential auction. The two allocation rules diﬀer only in
one detail: Virtual cost of the contestants and the singleproduct bidders is slightly higher
in the optimal auction, i. e. ψi(xi) = γi(xi) + 1
n−1
FC(xi)
fC(xi) for all i = 2,...,n. It is easy to
see that for both cases — substitutes and complements — the allocation rule that prevails
in the bundle auction is ”closer” to the optimal auction than the eﬃcient allocation rule
of the sequential second price auction. In other words, the advantage that the incumbent
receives by the power to subcontract the second contract at stage two moves the incentives
in the right direction and lowers the procurement cost. Note that as the total number of
bidders, n, increases, the fraction 1
n−1 becomes small and the bundle auction comes close
to the optimal sequential auction.
The three diﬀerent allocation rules are visualized in ﬁgure 1 for m = n = 2 and
20A detailed proof of this claim can be found in a previous version of this paper, Grimm (2004).
21See e. g. Hadar and Russell (1969), Theorem 4.
12FC(x) = x. The incumbent’s cost are plotted on the ordinate and the contestant’s cost
on the horizontal axis. Each line represents the second period allocation rule in one of the
mechanisms, as indicated. To the left of the respective line the second period contract is
awarded to the contestant, to the right of the line to the incumbent. Note that in none of
the mechanisms the allocation depends on the incumbent’s distribution. Thus, the picture
applies to both cases, substitutes and complements. Obviously, the allocation rule of the
Figure 1: Visualization of the three period–two–allocation rules.
bundle auction is always closer to the optimal auction than the eﬃcient second price rule.
The ﬁgure can also be used to illustrate why in the case of complements (which is
the case where it is quite natural to think about bundling) our result applies also to ﬁrst
price auctions, but this is not necessarily true in case of substitutes. Observe ﬁrst that
ﬁrst and second price bundle auctions are revenue equivalent. As established by Jeitschko
and Wolfstetter (2002) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2005), the sequential ﬁrst price
auction yields higher procurement cost than the sequential second price auction if the
contracts are complements. Graphically this means that the line representing the ﬁrst price
auction allocation rule is located to the right of the second price auction line22, and thus,
22This can also be seen in Jofre–Bonet and Pesendorfer (2005) who use the same graph to provide
intuition for their ranking of ﬁrst and second price sequential auctions.
13the ranking of bundle and sequential ﬁrst price auction is unambiguous. For substitutes,
the ﬁrst price allocation rule lies to the left of the second price allocation rule, i. e. in the
same direction as the bundle auction. Thus, a comparison is ambiguous and likely depends
on the incumbent’s distribution (which aﬀects procurement cost in the ﬁrst price, but not
in the bundle auction).
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have compared sequential and bundle procurement auctions of two con-
tracts, where competition for the second contract may be more intense. We have found
that a bundle auction yields a lower and less risky procurement cost than the sequential
second price auction, which still exceeds procurement cost in the optimal sequential auc-
tion. However, while in the bundle auction and in the optimal sequential auction the ﬁnal
allocation is ineﬃcient, the sequential second price auction achieves the eﬃcient allocation.
Procurement cost is less risky in the bundle auction than in the sequential second price
auction, since here the incumbent is paid the expected cost of the second contract at stage
one, where provision of the second object is delegated to him. In all auctions we analyzed,
the incumbent faces the risk of making an overall loss if the contracts are complements,
since he gambles on the value of incumbency in his ﬁrst stage bid.
Our ﬁndings imply that the choice of mechanism clearly depends on the objectives of
the auctioneer. If eﬃciency is the predominant concern (which is plausible if the auctioneer
is a public authority), the sequential auction is the appropriate mechanism among the
mechanisms considered here. If the auctioneer maximizes revenue (e. g. a private sector
ﬁrm), a bundle auction is a good choice. As we have shown, the allocation rule of the bundle
auction is quite ”close” to the optimal allocation rule. Moreover, the bundle auction even
has some advantages compared to the optimal sequential auction: First, procurement cost
is less risky since the stage two–price risk is borne by the incumbent. Second, whereas in
the optimal sequential auction the auctioneer has an incentive to deviate from the rules he
announced for stage two after the ﬁrst period is over, in bundle auction this problem does
not occur.23
Let us conclude with two considerations beyond the analysis of this paper. First, con-
sider the case that the incumbent’s comparative advantage is endogenous, i. e. has to
23In fact, the auctioneer does not have an incentive to prohibit resale before or after the bundle auction.
14be induced by speciﬁc investment. Then, there will be no incentive to incur such cost
in the bundle auction (where, by speciﬁc investment, the incumbent would only decrease
his expected proﬁts from subcontracting), while the sequential auction might give rise to
”wasteful” expenditures that only aim at discriminating against potential competitors in
the second auction. Second, the choice of mechanism may have an impact on the compe-
tition for the second production right. In the bundle and the optimal sequential auction,
strong singleproduct bidders are discriminated against even more than the contestants.
Therefore, their incentives to enter the game are presumably lower in those auctions than
in the sequential second price auction.
A The Value of Incumbency
In order to prove that E[ΠI
2]−E[ΠC
2 ] > (<)0 if the objects are complements (substitutes),
we deﬁne the vector of all bidders’ expected cost for the second item except the incumbent’s
and one (representative) contestant’s cost by ˜ X := (Xi), i  = 1,2. We denote by ˜ X(1) the
lowest cost among those bidders and by ˜ F(1) ( ˜ f(1)) the corresponding c.d.f (density function).














2 ] = E
￿




˜ X(1) − XC;XC ≤ ˜ X(1) ≤ X1
￿
.
First, we derive E[ΠC


































































































(1 − ˜ F(1)(v))(1 − F1(v))FC(v)dv. (17)






(1 − ˜ F(1)(v))F1(v)(1 − FC(v))dv. (18)
Clearly, if XC is exceeds (falls short of) X1 in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,
it holds that (1−F1(v))FC(v) < (>)F1(v)(1−FC(v)) for every v ∈ [0,1], which proves the
assertion. ￿
B The Optimal Sequential Auction
In this section we derive the optimal auction rule under the assumption that the auc-
tioneer has to ﬁx it before period one and cannot change it between the periods. We
know that we can restrict our attention to direct incentive compatible mechanisms. We
denote such a mechanism by the quadruple of vectors (φ1(q),φ2(x),t1(q),t2(x)), where
φk
i( ) is the probability that ﬁrm i is awarded the contract in period k given that reports
q (respectively x) have been made and tk
i( ) denotes the transfer to i in period k given
the reports. Let Φ1
i(qi) and T 1
i (qi) denote the expected probability to win and the ex-












i (xi) analogously, accounting for the fact that we potentially have more bidder in period
two, i. e. n ≥ m. Then, the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm i from period one and two if its cost
16are qi and xi but it reports ˆ qi and ˆ xi are given by
π
2
i(xi, ˆ xi) = T
2





i (qi, ˆ qi) = T
1
i (ˆ qi) − qiΦ
1





















i(qi, ˆ qi) for all ˆ qi  = qi, (IC1)
π
2
i (xi,xi) ≥ π
2
i(xi, ˆ xi) for all ˆ xi  = xi, (IC2)
and the participation constraints require that
π
2



















From (IC1) and (IC2) it follows that Φk
i( ), k = 1,2, is monotone decreasing and a bidder’s
expected equilibrium proﬁt is determined by the probability of winning up to a constant





i (Q,Q), and analogously for π2
i(xi,xi).24 Note that from the last equation

























This leads to the following expected transfers of bidder i in period one and two, respectively,
T
2





































24See, for example, Krishna (2002), pp. 63 ﬀ.
17Now we compute the sum of expected transfer payments to the bidders which the
























































































































































Adding and subtracting the term m 
R 1
0 π2












(= 0 due to (PC1b)) yields an






























































18At the ﬁrst stage, if the ﬁrms are symmetric, a standard ﬁrst or second price auction is
optimal. At the second stage, the optimal auction favors the incumbent and discriminates
against the contestants and the single product bidders. The reason is that decreasing a
contestant’s expected proﬁts from the second stage makes the stage one–bids more com-
petitive. In the above formula, the incumbent is indexed by ”1”, and the contestants and
singleproduct bidders by ”C and S, respectively. The optimal mechanism is stated in
proposition 3.
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